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Introduction 
 
In the field of Industrial Organization many are the empirical studies 
on the measurement of market power applied to the food industry. 
The relevance of measuring market power is really high, especially 
from the point of view of policy makers aiming to analyze the degree 
of competition among players along the supply chain, where market 
power influences both vertical and horizontal relationships. 
It is therefore crucial for policy makers and Antistrust institutions to 
have a correct measure of the degree of market power in order to 
ascertain and evaluate market distortions and abuse of dominant 
position and to define correct policies; there are many situations in 
which the measurement of market power is required, for example in 
evaluating the impact due to a merger or a buyout, as well as the 
introduction of a new product or of a new policy or of a new 
strategy. 
On the other hand, from the point of view of an individual firm, it 
may be important to know the competitive positions of all the 
incumbents within the market for all its strategic decisions, from 
strategies on pricing and on promotion to strategies on merger and 
diversification. 
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In the modern food chain, mainly characterized by the presence of an 
intense process of differentiation in products attributes, it is 
important to measure market power within markets with non-
homogeneous products. In the Industrial Organization literature 
many approaches to estimating market power are available, as 
reviewed in chapter 1, but of course the choice of a model with 
respect to another it is not an easy task and have many important 
implications.  
 
This research mainly aims to provide a description of the Italian milk 
market considering two particular aspects: 
• The consumer behavior: which characteristics are important on 
the purchasing decision; how the consumption shift from one 
category of milk to another one; the degree of substitution 
between (ultra-high-temperature pastured) “UHT” milk and 
refrigerated one. 
• The behavior of the major players of the Industry and the degree of 
market power: Analyze the price brand competition in the 
Italian milk market among the major player: Granarolo, 
Parmalat and Private Labels.   
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Using a nested logit model, a well-known model in the discrete 
choice literature, I estimate how the consumer behaviour on 
purchasing decision is sensitive to particular product characteristics.  
Then, following Nevo (2001), I use the estimated demand parameters 
to determine economic profit margins (PM) in the milk industry, 
under three different conduct strategies of firms. The first one is just 
related to the ability of the firms to differentiate their product from 
those of their competitors. The second one is the Portfolio effect 
which is based on the principle that if a firm produces more than one 
product and products are not perceived as perfect substitutes by the 
consumer, then the firm is able to charge prices higher than those 
charged if products were produced separately by two different 
manufactures. The third situation refers to the possibility of collusion 
between players.  
In the first chapter, I review the literature on product differentiation 
as one of the ways to escape from the Bertrand Paradox, where, 
under the assumptions of the Bertrand oligopoly model of price 
competition, price equal to marginal cost becomes the only 
equilibrium. Considering products as differentiated, firms are able to 
transcend from the Paradox and to gain a premium price exercising 
some market power. On a modern market, many are the ways to 
differentiate products: packaging, advertisement, intrinsic 
characteristics, promotions, place. Moreover, marketing became a 
 - 10 - 
strategic area on the management of the firms, as, in a dynamic 
market with high degree of competition, differentiating your own 
product from those of the competitors is crucial to gain a premium 
price and to reach a particular segment of the market. A good 
segmentation of the market and the implementation of correct 
strategies to reach the target are decisive on the placement of the firm 
in the market.  
On the other side, the issue of market power is of particular interest 
to policy makers and legislators as its exploitation can significantly 
erode market welfare, damaging consumers and incumbents benefits 
and producing deadweight losses. Furthermore, if we look at the 
market as a set of segments of consumers purchasing differentiated 
products, just considering the degree of competition among firms 
and the power within the market, without taking into account the 
substitution patterns among different products can be misleading. 
Antitrust merger and market power analysis usually refers to 
differentiated-products markets.  
A second part of the first chapter is devoted to review the literature 
of empirical Industrial Organization (IO) on models used for the 
measurement of  the degree of market power. Starting from the 
Structure-Conduct-Performance approach, that was the most used in 
IO from 1950’s to 1980’s, I briefly mention the “market poker versus 
efficiency” discussion between the Harvard school and the Chicago 
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school. Then, I refer to the empirical research that uses structural 
parameter to estimate and test the degree of market power. Such 
approach belongs to the New Empirical Industrial Organization 
(NEIO); starting from 1980’s many are the applications of these 
models on the measurement of industries’ market power, with a 
particular focus on food industry.  
I finally introduce models which measure market power starting 
from a demand estimation and using the estimated coefficients to 
compute the Lerner Index and Profit Margins. This last group of 
models is really sensitive to the quality of the demand estimation, 
which is a crucial issue for the validity of the measurement of market 
power. Then I briefly illustrate the product and characteristics space 
approaches to the demand estimation going though the pros and 
cons of both. 
The demand and supply sides of the model are both described in the 
second chapter. First, starting from a Bertrand competition and 
assuming constant marginal cost, I present the supply framework 
and show how to calculate Profit Margins from the estimated 
elasticities without observing actual costs. Second, in describing the 
demand side, I start from the Lancaster’s approach, which considers 
products as bundles of characteristics, to introduce Discrete Choice 
models, following Berry (1994). I then discuss how different models 
deal with the Independence for Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) 
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property: in particular I focus on the nested logit model, which is the 
one chosen for the empirical analysis and allows for more flexibility 
in the estimation of cross price elasticities; also the endogeneity issue 
and the computation of the market share of the outside good are 
briefly discussed.   
In the third chapter I give an overview of the methodology used, 
starting from the goals of the research, I describe the IRI (Information 
Resources Incorporated) Infoscan database and the steps in the 
research. Moreover, I describe the econometric techniques used to 
solve the endogeneity issue and the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) as method of estimation. 
I present the application of the model in the Italian milk industry in 
chapter four and five, describing first the specification of the model 
used and second how to use the  estimated coefficients  to determine 
price elasticities and profit margins, as a measure of the degree of 
market power. 
In chapter four I first provide a brief description of the Italian milk 
market, followed by the specification of the model; then the  
estimation technique, including the treatment of the endogeneity 
issue, is presented. I estimate vendor-level demand; then using 
estimates jointly with the pricing rule derived from different models 
of firm conduct, I estimate profit margins (PM) without observing 
actual cost., assuming a Nash-Bertrand game in price under three 
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different industries structures: single-product firm, multi-product 
firm and multi-brand monopolist. In the first case PMs are just given 
by product differentiation; in the second case are given by a portfolio 
effect, and finally in the third case they are obtained under the 
hypothesis of a joint ownership or full collusion. Conclusions follow 
in the last section. 
  
 
